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MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: A TRIBUTE FROM AUSTRALIA
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE SIR OWEN DIXONI
THIS salutation to Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter comes from an Australian
judge who stands deeply in his debt. It is a debt under which a high intelli-
gence and a generous heart has placed the writer by the constant encourage-
ment and support which friendship gives and by the lively communication of
the products of a great mind and a lofty spirit.
In return the Australian can do little but acknowledge his obligation and,
by way of tribute, offer a lawyer's statement of why it is that the work of
Frankfurter has a peculiar importance in the constitutional law of Australia
and how it came about that his interest in that Commonwealth was aroused.
Australia is a large continent and until, in the first year of the twentieth
century, a federal union was formed, it was divided into six separate colonies
each enjoying its own unitary form of government under a democratic bicam-
eral system. Some ten years before some of the leaders in these independent
colonies had turned their thoughts towards uniting the six colonies into one
federal Commonwealth. With such thoughts in their minds it became certain
that they must consider American federalism as providing the pattern which
they might agree to follow. Some of them, perhaps not very many at that time,
began to make a study of the constitutional law of the United States. During
the decade that followed, a draft constitution was produced and agreed upon
which adopted American federalism as its basis. Strange, however, as it may
seem to Americans, it was not the federalism as it was perfected in 1791 by
the adoption of the Bill of Rights, but that of the Constitution of the United
States as it had stood immediately before that date. To British colonies at the
end of the Victorian era guarantees of personal liberty seemed unnecessary.
An exception was made in the case of religious freedom 1 and of expropriation
without just terms.2 But for the rest there were no constitutional guarantees
of individual rights. In other respects, however, what was done was to make
a combination of the British parliamentary system of responsible government
with federalism on the general pattern of the original Constitution of the United
States.
It has meant of course that to Australians no small part of the constitutional
law of the United States must be of first importance. Accordingly lawyers
tG.C.M.G., Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia.
1. AusTR. Co.xsr. § 116.
2. Id. § 51(xxxi).
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whose work calls for any consideration of Australian constitutional questions
cannot neglect the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States.
The High Court of Australia was set up in 1903 and from the beginning the
opinions of the Justices of the Supreme Court were frequently cited and dis-
cussed. One of the earliest subjects of controversy was the question of recip-
rocal state and commonwealth immunities and that of course opened up the
whole field of McCulloch v. Maryland,3 Veazie Bank v. Fenno,4 Collector v.
Day 6 and South Carolina v. United States.6
In the year 1914 one of-the Judges of the High Court of Australia visited
the United States and at Harvard met two future Justices of the Supreme
Court-Louis D. Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter. He was H. B. Higgins who
was appointed in 1906 and died in office in 1929. For the first thirteen years
of that period he devoted much of his time and energy to the work of industrial
arbitration and in that field gained a fame spreading beyond the limits of the
Commonwealth. With both Brandeis and Frankfurter he maintained a corres-
pondence after his return to Australia. In 1924 he again visited the United
States and again met them. It is evident that a friendship sprang up between
Frankfurter and Higgins and there can be little doubt that as a result Higgins
obtained a much livelier and more informed understanding of the course of
decision in the Supreme Court during those years than he could obtain from a
reading in Melbourne of the reports of the opinions given in Washington. It
happened that Higgins, long before he met Frankfurter, had in the High Court
of Australia stood out against the course taken by that Court in adopting the
extreme doctrine of state and federal reciprocal immunity. On the federal side
he had refused to acknowledge not merely the applicability of Marshall's doc-
trine to the Commonwealth Constitution but even the soundness in point of law
of the doctrine itself. Higgins died long before the decision in Graves v. New
York 7 but it would have formed for him a source of great satisfaction. For he
had never relinquished his opposition to the full doctrine of intergovernmental
immunity and at lefigth, about eighteen years before that decision, he had
formed one member of a court which had renounced for Australia the doctrine,
which the same court as earlier constituted had espoused, of the reciprocal
immunity of government agencies or instrumentalities." It would have delighted
him to find this decision referred to in the concurring opinion of Frankfurter
but even more to read in that opinion the statement--"All these doctrines of
intergovernmental immunity have until recently been moving in the realm of
what Lincoln called 'pernicious abstractions'." 9
Had there never been a meeting between Frankfurter and Higgins one may
be sure that the work of the former would have commanded attention in the
3. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
4. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869).
5. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871).
6. 199 U.S. 437 (1905).
7. 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
8. See D'Emden v. Pedder, 1 Commw. L.R. 91 (Austr. 1904).
9. 306 U.S. at 490.
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Australian High Court. In the same way one may be sure that in what Lord
Evershed, the Master of the Rolls, has recently called "his extraordinary intel-
lectual energy"' 0 Frankfurter would have taken into his wide survey of legal
affairs the constitutional developments in Australia. But it is not unimportant
that they met and that they met when they did. For it meant that Frankfurter's
writings were referred to in Australia long before he became a member of the
Supreme Court and his name became not unfamiliar to those arguing consti-
tutional cases in the High Court. Indeed it is probable that the curiosity of
Australian constitutional lawyers about the Supreme Court was first really
aroused by the publication of The Bvsiness of the Supreme Court by Frank-
furter and Landis when that work appeared in 1927. It is a book which found
its way into the hands of most of the Judges of the High Court as well as of
some of the counsel habitually appearing in such cases.
It was natural when Frankfurter reached the Bench for men to turn with
special interest to his opinions. The very subject matter of Graves v. New
York attracted the attention of Australian constitutional lawyers. The course
pursued some eighteen years before by the High Court in overthrowing earlier
doctrine had called forth some rather acrid criticisms, particularly among those
who supported the interests of States. What Frankfurter said had a special
relevance. For it amounted so to speak to retrospective justification of some of
the grounds taken by the judges who cast aside the old doctrine derived from
the earlier American cases and at the same time it suggested the true nature
of the respective implications which set limits to interference by states with the
exercise of federal functions and vice versa.
As time passed an increasing number of Australians visited Washington. No
one can be more generous than Frankfurter in making time for those whom
he is asked to see and as a result a quite extraordinary number of lawyers in
Australia may say that they know him personally. They range from men hold-
ing the highest offices of State to men conducting practices at the Bar. The
high quality of his writings, judicial and extra-judicial, would in any case have
caught the attention of students of constitutional law in Australia, to say noth-
ing of its other votaries, both judges and counsel. One may be sure that they
would go to his opinions as specially significant expositions of law. It must be
borne in mind that the authority of the decisions of the Supreme Court in the
High Court of Australia is merely persuasive. It is not imperative and always
the degree of persuasiveness possessed by persuasive authority is intrinsic.
Frankfurter's opinions are written in no ordinary style and it is particularly
true in his case that to know the man is to read with additional perception the
adroit phrases, the epithets charged with calculated implication and even the
significant ellipses, all of which often combine to form the expression of a very
closely reasoned argument.
Of course the cases that commanded the greatest attention were those that
most nearly touched Australian problems. As it happened the war brought an
10. Evershed, The Impact of Statute oi, the Law of England, 42 BRITIsH ACADEMY
PROCEEDINGs 253 (1956).
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unexpected difficulty with reference to the guarantee of the free exercise of a
religion." Jehovah's Witnesses were regarded by the authorities as obstruct-
ing the war effort and were dealt with accordingly. In answer they placed their
reliance upon the constitutional denial to the Commonwealth of power to make
laws for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion. The decision of the High
Court 12 was given while the judgment of the Supreme Court in the Gobitis
case still stood.' 3 The Australian case involved other questions, but the whole
Court took the view that the Commonwealth Parliament was not restrained
from making laws prohibiting the advocacy of doctrines or principles which,
though advocated in pursuance of religious conviction, were prejudicial to the
prosecution of the war in which the Commonwealth was engaged.
The opinion which Frankfurter wrote for the Court in the Gobitis case was
of course much canvassed during the argument before the High Court and there
is much indeed in the Australian judgments inconsistent with any view but that
taken in that majority opinion. But before the final report of the decision of
the High Court was published West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette 14 had
been decided, and a terse but unrelenting reference to that case was added by
Starke J., to the report of his judgment.
To an Australian it seems a pity that Frankfurter had no opportunity (such
was the timing) of adding to his dissenting opinion some extracts from the
reasons of the High Court, that is assuming that he deemed them auxiliaries
worthy of enlisting in support of his view.
The Commonwealth Constitution includes a full faith and credit clause 16
and accordingly the two cases of Williams v. North Carolina have taken their
place in Australia as part of the esoteric writings wherein is held the key to
that constitutional puzzle.' 6 Fullagar J., now of the High Court of Australia
but formerly a judge of the Supreme Court of Victoria, wrote in the latter
capacity the judgment in Harris v. Harris.7 It is a judgment that has proved
of wide interest. This is not the place to discuss the case, a thing that has been
done by Professor Erwin Griswold.' 8 The case is referred to here because it
provides another example of the importance which judges in Australia attach
to an opinion of Frankfurter. Fullagar J., notes that in the first Williams case
there were left open the questions of the reality of the domicil in Nevada, the
possible effect of residence in the jurisdiction where the decree was granted
and the power of the Court of North Carolina to refuse full faith and credit to
the decree of Nevada because, contrary to the finding made by the Court of the
11. AusTR. CONST. § 116.
12. Adelaide Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 67 Commw. L.R. 116
(Austr. 1943).
13. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
14. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
15. AUSTR. CONST. § 118.
16. 617 U.S. 287 (1942) ; 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
17. [1947] Vict. L.R. 44 (Austr. 1946).
18. Griswold, Divorce Jurisdiction and Recognition of Divorce Decrees-A Com-
parative Study, 25 Ausm. L.J. 248, 261-62 (1951).
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latter state, the Court of North Carolina found that no domicil existed.' 9 He
then proceeds-"Although the important questions mentioned were expressly
left open by Williams v. North Carolina, a careful reader of the judgments
might, I think, not unreasonably have prophesied that, if and when those ques-
tions demanded determination, they would be determined in favour of the
validity of the decrees. But it seems to be the contrary view that has ultimately
found acceptance." 20 He turns finally to the statement of Frankfurter--"In
short, the decree of divorce is a conclusive adjudication of everything except
the jurisdictional facts upon which it is founded, and domicil is a jurisdictional
fact."'2 1 Again-"To permit the necessary finding of domicil by one State to
foreclose all States in the protection of their social institutions would be in-
tolerable. '22
You will see Frankfurter's name again and again in the reports of the con-
stitutional decisions of the High Court. When you find in judicial writings
repeated reliance upon the words of a contemporary judge, especially of an-
other country, you may safely infer that his opinions tend to throw new light
in dark places and to comfort other judicial wayfarers by giving apt and re-
assuring pointers to a true deliverance.
Sometimes there has been more than mere quotation; Frankfurter's view of
the working of principle in some respect has been treated as confirmatory of
specific reasoning adopted in the High Court. Some mention has already been
made of Graves v. New York. In two cases of great importance in Australia
the High Court decided that Commonwealth legislation affecting banking was
ultra vires. In the first a provision that without the consent of the federal
Treasurer no bank should conduct any banking business for a State was held
void as a discriminatory interference with a State which the legislative power
with respect to banking did not justify.23 In this decision the several judg-
ments delivered in the High Court made much use of Graves v. New York
and of the opinion of Frankfurter in the Saratoga Springs case. 24
The principles to which this decision gave effect were not those of the aban-
doned doctrine of mutual noninterference. Some attempt to mark the distinc-
tion had been made years before.2 5 But the opinion of Frankfurter in the
Saratoga Springs case was welcomed as a timely exposition of the whole sub-
ject. The views he expressed both on that occasion and in Graves v. New
York have accordingly been much considered in the High Court. That fact
may be seen reflected in the citations of the two opinions which the Judges of
the High Court make in the reasons which they severally delivered. These
reasons went over ground that in the United States would not be regarded as
19. [1947] Vict. L.R. at 52.
20. Id. at 53.
21. Id. at 54.
22. Ibid.
23. Melbourne Corp. v. Commonwealth, 74 Commw. L.R. 31 (Austr. 1947).
24. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
25. West v. Commissioner, 56 Commw. L.R. 657, 681-82 (Austr. 1937).
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unfamiliar. One point, however, was included the mention of which may have
proved of unexpected importance. It consisted in the difference between on the
one hand a uniform law establishing, for example, a government banking
system which all, including the States, must use, and on the other hand a law
specially regulating banking by the States. After the decision had been given,
the Commonwealth Parliament, perhaps noting this distinction, enacted a law
for the nationalization of banking. Its validity was immediately attacked and
the attack resulted in one of the major decisions in Australian constitutional
law.2 6 The field of controversy was a wide one, but one objection found fatal
to the validity of the legislation was that it offended against a provision peculiar
to the Commonwealth Constitution which declares that trade, commerce and
intercourse among the States shall be absolutely free.27 An attempt was made
to answer the objection on the ground, among others, that banking did not form
part of interstate commerce. As may be supposed such an answer immediately
brought into the forefront of the battle the opinion written by Frankfurter for
the Supreme Court in Polish Nat'l Alliance v. NLRB 28 and the opinions writ-
ten in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n.2 9 The whole ques-
tion of Paul v. Virginia and the place of intangibles in the commerce clause
was drawn in question. 30 The Court came down heavily on the side of the in-
tangibles and ruled that banking across state borders was within the protection
of the Australian guarantee of freedom of interstate commerce. Moreover there
was much canvassing of the degree of similarity of this guarantee to the anal-
ogous protection from state action which commerce enjoys in the United States.
In Freeman v. Hewit Frankfurter writing for the Court describes it thus:
"This limitation on State power, as the Morgan case so well illustrates, does
not merely forbid a State to single out interstate commerce for hostile action.
A State is also precluded from taking any action which may fairly be deemed
to have the effect of impeding the free flow of trade between States. It is im-
material that local commerce is subjected to a similar encumbrance. It may
commend itself to a State to encourage a pastoral instead of an industrial so-
ciety. That is its concern and its privilege. But to compare a State's treatment
of its local trade with the exertion of its authority against commerce in the
national domain is to compare incomparables. These principles of limitation
on State power apply to all State policy no matter what State interest gives rise
to its legislation."3 1 More than once this description has been cited in Australia
for the purpose of attempting to show how close the Australian express guar-
antee of the freedom of interstate commerce is to the constitutional protection
worked out in the United States. It was cited in the great Banking Case.3 2
26. Bank v. Commonwealth, 76 Commw. L.R. 1 (Austr. 1948).
27. AusTR. CoNST. § 92.
28. 322 U.S. 643 (1944).
29. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
30. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
31. 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946).
32. Bank v. Commonwealth, 76 Commw. L.R. 1 (Austr. 1948).
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The effect which the Australian guarantee of freedom of interstate com-
merce has on transport by road has been a fruitful source of controversy, but
at length it has been established that no restrictions can be placed upon the
carrier if they be more than regulatory of the traffic. In working out such a
conception constant recourse has been had to the decisions of the Supreme
Court. So far as they are against the validity of any particular restriction or
money charge they are generally considered as indicating that, a fortiori, such
a thing must be invalid in Australia. But you cannot reason e contra.
In all this not only has the formulation by Frankfurter in Freeman v. Hewit
of the basal American principle played a part but, the controversy having more
recently moved to the question whether interstate hauliers may be included in
any form of mileage or other charge for using the roads of a State, great im-
portance has been attached to his dissenting judgment in Capitol Greyhound
Lines v. Brice.
33
The warning given by Frankfurter in Freeman v. Hewit that some aspects
of the questions raised by pecuniary impositions affecting interstate commerce
are beyond the limits of judicial process has not passed unnoticed in the High
Court. Moreover when in Braniff Airways v. Nebraska State Bd. ' Frank-
furter repeated the warning and spoke of the action of Congress being required,
he necessarily brought out a special difficulty for Australia. For the constitu-
tional declaration of the absolute freedom of interstate commerce binds the
Commonwealth as much as the States and therefore restricts the federal legis-
lative power with respect to commerce. Indeed it may be said that the Aus-
tralian position is just as it would be in the United States had Congress, instead
of regulating commerce, positively enacted in broad terms that trade, commerce
and intercourse among the states should be absolutely free.
It will therefore be seen that the observations in these opinions of Frank-
furter concerning pecuniary charges in connexion with roads and airways con-
tain implications for Australia which must add to the inherent significance they
possess in their country of origin.
The choice of examples of the use made in Australia of Frankfurter's judicial
writings is a wide one; there are many pages in the law reports besides those
that have been mentioned which bear some citation from his work. It would
be a pleasing exercise to multiply examples but it would do no more than add
needless confirmation to the knowledge that his name holds a definite place in
the legal annals of Australia.
It will doubtless have been noted that what may be considered distinctly
Australian problems have arisen out of the adoption of much of American fed-
eralism. It is a significant thing that in these distinctly Australian problems
assistance has been sought and found in Frankfurter's judicial writings. This
has been done in dealing with questions arising in a section of the real world
33. 339 U.S. 542, 548 (1950). See Hughes and Vale Proprietary, Ltd. v. New South
Wales (No. 2), 93 Commw. L.R. 127 (Austr. 1955).
34. Braniff Airvays, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equalization, 347 U.S. 590, 606-07
(1954) (dissenting opinion).
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of affairs. It is a section by no means the same in significance as that in and
for which Frankfurter's great judicial and academical work has been done
specifically. Yet it is worth notice that Australia takes into account, in the
determination of its own more serious problems of constitutional government,
what Frankfurter has thought and written. For it not only adds another testi-
mony to his greatness as a lawyer but means too, what those who know him
never doubt, namely that he is a publicist in whose thought no division between
law and practical affairs has ever been allowed. With his wide and lively in-
terest in men and things it could not be otherwise.
The friends of Mr. justice Frankfurter in Australia are by no means all law-
yers. Many Australians whose work lies outside the law have met him and
come to know him. This no doubt has been the result of the great width of his
sympathies, his very real interest in what men do and think and his natural
friendliness. His great qualities of mind and heart combined as they are with
a deep and extensive understanding of world affairs have carried his fame into
many parts of the world. In Australia he commands the high regard of all
constitutional lawyers. Those Australians who have studied his work and ob-
tained that intimate knowledge of the man which friendship gives, place him
among the great men of the time.
